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This paper investigates the macroeconomic challenges created by a surge in aid inflows. It 
develops an analytical framework for examining possible policy responses to increased aid, 
in terms of absorption and spending of aid—where the central bank controls absorption 
through monetary policy and the sale of foreign exchange and the fiscal authority controls 
spending. Different combinations of absorption and spending lead to different 
macroeconomic consequences. Evidence from five countries that recently experienced an 
aid surge (Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda) shows no support for aid-
related real exchange rate appreciation in these countries, but indicates that the fear of 
Dutch disease played an important part in the policy reaction to aid surges. Fiscal and 
monetary authorities should coordinate their responses to an aid surge, because an 
uncoordinated response—typically when fiscal authority wants to spend aid while the 
central bank wants to avoid exchange rate appreciation—can have serious negative 
macroeconomic consequences. 
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1 Introduction   
The increased focus of the international community on scaling up aid in support of the 
Millennium Development Goals makes the challenges of using aid effectively a key 
priority for policymakers. While aid presents an opportunity to reduce poverty and 
generate sustained growth, the effective use of increased aid also presents challenges. 
High levels of aid inflows can cause upward pressure on the real exchange rate, to the 
detriment of the exporting industries that may be critical to long-run growth. Aid 
inflows can also create problems of fiscal management and debt sustainability, 
particularly when they are volatile and when they come in the form of debt. An 
analytical framework that emphasizes the different roles of monetary and fiscal policy is 
used to analyse key macroeconomic issues in managing large increases in aid. The key 
issues are: 
—  Do recipients of aid surges encounter macroeconomic absorptive capacity 
constraints?  
—  Do aid surges lead to real exchange rate appreciations that are harmful to the 
export sector and hence economic growth? 
—  How should fiscal policy be adapted to aid surges?  
—  Are aid inflows inflationary, and what is the appropriate monetary and 
exchange rate policy response?  
This paper’s contribution to the existing research is twofold.1 First, it develops a 
framework to examine the nuts-and-bolts policy questions of direct relevance to 
macroeconomic policymakers.2 Second, it systematically analyses cases in which 
countries experienced large aid surges, thereby complementing existing research, which 
is based mainly on cross-country and panel econometric models. The case studies focus 
on strong performers in terms of institutions and economic policies. The goal is to learn 
how to help those countries that are well-positioned, institutionally and in terms of the 
policy framework, to absorb large quantities of aid. The countries covered in this study 
are Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
Contrary to the prevailing presumption, the case studies reveal no significant real 
appreciation accompanying the surge in aid in any of the sample countries.3 Even taking 
into account simultaneous terms-of-trade shocks in some countries does not explain this 
unexpected result. However, all the countries in the sample were reluctant to fully 
absorb the increments in aid through a corresponding rise in net imports. In other words, 
a considerable part of the aid was used to build international reserves, rather than to 
transfer resources from donor to recipient country. This finding suggests that a primary 
concern for not absorbing additional aid was competitiveness, manifested in a 
                                                 
1  An earlier and more detailed version of this paper is published as an IMF Occasional Paper (Berg  
et al. 2007). Also see IMF (2005a). 
2   The absorb-and-spend framework developed at the IMF and presented here and in IMF (2007, 2005a) 
has been used in a number of subsequent analyses, including Chowdhury and McKinley (2006), 
Foster and Killick (2006), and Adam et al. (2007). 
3   See Rajan and Subramanian (2005) for an analysis of the Dutch disease impact of foreign aid, and a 
survey of the earlier literature.  
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reluctance to accept real appreciation of the exchange rate. Thus, the study finds no 
evidence of actual Dutch disease, but there is ample evidence that the fear of real 
exchange rate appreciation played an important part in the policy reaction to aid. 
While the central banks held a substantial part of the aid in reserves, the fiscal 
authorities often tried to spend aid. Public expenditures were increased using the local 
currency obtained from selling the aid dollars to the central bank. In effect, such a 
policy is very similar to a domestically financed fiscal expansion, except that reserves 
are now larger. It leads to identical outcomes, such as a surge in the money supply, and 
a consequent need to decide between inflation, on the one hand, and crowding out the 
private sector through the sale of treasury bills, on the other. The paper concludes that it 
is crucial for fiscal and monetary authorities to coordinate their responses to an aid 
surge. An uncoordinated response—typically arising because the fiscal authority wants 
to spend aid while the monetary authority wants to avoid exchange rate appreciation—
can have unintended negative macroeconomic consequences.  
2  Macroeconomic framework for analysis of increases in aid Inflows 
The macroeconomic impact of aid depends critically on the policy response to aid—
particularly the interaction of fiscal policy with monetary and exchange rate policy. To 
understand the importance of the response to aid, it is useful to introduce two related but 
distinct concepts: absorption and spending. 
Absorption is defined as the extent to which the current account deficit excluding aid 
widens in response to an increase in aid inflows. This measure captures the quantity of 
net imports financed by an increment in aid, which represents the real transfer of 
resources enabled by aid. Absorption captures both the direct and indirect increase in 
imports financed by aid, i.e., direct purchases of imports by the government, as well as 
second-round increases in net imports resulting from aid-driven increases in public or 
private expenditures. This concept of absorption can be defined and understood in terms 
of the balance of payments identity:  
Aid inflows = ΔReserves – Current account excluding aid – Capital account 
excluding aid 
Thus, scaling up of aid can serve some combination of three purposes: an increase in the 
reserve accumulation, an increase in capital outflows, and an increase in the non-aid 
current account deficit. The rate of absorption of an increase in aid is then defined as the 
change (Δ) in the current account (excluding aid) deficit as a share of the change in aid 
inflows: 
Absorption of aid = Δ(Non-aid current account deficit)/ΔAid 
For a given fiscal policy, absorption is controlled by the central bank, through its 
decision about how much of the foreign exchange associated with aid to sell, and 
through its interest rates policy, which influences the demand for private imports via 
aggregate demand.   
3 
Spending of aid is defined as the widening in the government fiscal deficit net of aid 
that accompanies an increment in aid: 
Spending of aid = Δ(Total expenditures – Domestic revenue)/ΔAid 
Spending captures the extent to which the government uses aid to finance an increase in 
expenditures or a reduction in taxation. Even if the aid comes tied to particular 
expenditures, governments can choose whether or not to increase the overall fiscal 
deficit as aid increases. The aid-related increases in expenditures could be on imports or 
domestically-produced goods and services. Analysing spending is important because of 
the natural focus on the budget as a policy variable, and also because of the importance 
of tensions between the fiscal policy response to aid and broader macroeconomic 
objectives with respect to the exchange rate and inflation. 
Absorption and spending are distinct, though related, concepts and policy choices.4 If 
aid comes in kind, or if the government spends aid dollars directly on imports, spending 
and absorption are equivalent, and there is no significant impact on the exchange rate, 
price level, and interest rates. This paper, however, concentrates on the more difficult 
and relevant case where aid dollars are given to the government, which immediately 
sells them to the central bank. Subsequently, the government decides how much of the 
local currency counterpart to spend on domestic projects, while the central bank decides 
how much of the aid-related foreign exchange to sell on the market; and, in general, 
spending differs from absorption. 
The four basic combinations of absorption and spending are described below, together 
with a discussion of the macroeconomic implications of each.  
(i)   Aid absorbed and spent is the case most frequently assumed in discussions of the 
impact of aid inflows (e.g., Bevan 2005). The government spends the aid 
increment and foreign exchange is sold by the central bank and absorbed by the 
economy via a widening of the current account deficit. The fiscal deficit is 
larger, but financed by higher aid. Spending and absorption of aid allows an 
increase in government spending by redeploying resources that had been devoted 
to the traded goods sector. The aid dollars fill the foreign exchange gap that 
would result from transferring resources to aid-financed projects. Some real 
exchange rate appreciation may be necessary and indeed appropriate in response 
to a sustained higher level of aid. This is because some combination of exchange 
rate appreciation and (if there is excess capacity) increased aggregate demand is 
necessary to generate the increased net imports that aid allows. 
Of course, output may not be fixed and recipient economy may have significant 
unemployed resources. In such a situation, a fiscal expansion may well increase 
output, both in the short run through the effects of increased spending on 
                                                 
4  The distinction between absorption and spending, in the terminology used in this paper, is one of the 
central issues associated with the ‘transfer problem’ discussed in Keynes (1929). Keynes was 
concerned with Germany’s problems in generating current account surpluses to pay reparations after 
the First World War. He argued that for the fiscal authorities to accumulate the local currency 
counterpart to the required transfers was only part of the transfer problem—the other part being 
generating the net exports and therefore the required foreign exchange. See Milesi-Ferreti and Lane 
(2004) for a recent general discussion of the transfer problem and the real exchange rate.  
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aggregate demand and in the long run through the increase in the capital stock. 
To the extent that output can be increased through a fiscal expansion without 
leading to a deterioration in the current account, however, these increases in 
aggregate demand and investment could have been undertaken without the aid 
flows. Aid absorption refers to the use of aid to finance changes in the current 
account deficit associated with aid-related increases in aggregate demand, 
investment, and output in general. 
The degree of exchange rate appreciation required to absorb the aid will depend, 
in general, on the structural response of the economy and the extent to which aid 
directly finances imports. For example, real appreciation would be higher to the 
extent that aid inflows finance expenditures on nontradable goods rather than 
directly financing imports. On the other hand, if higher incomes feed strongly 
into higher import demand, and if the supply of nontraded goods responds 
strongly to the increase in their relative price, the real appreciation would be 
limited. In economies with the potential for a quick supply response, the 
additional demand for nontradable goods could induce additional employment 
and production, with little increase in the price level and limited real 
appreciation. In the longer run, investments that increase productivity in the 
nontradable sector could also reduce or even eliminate the real exchange rate 
appreciation.  
The mechanism for real appreciation would vary depending on the exchange rate 
regime. In a pure float, the central bank would sell the foreign exchange 
associated with the aid, causing a nominal (and real) exchange rate appreciation. 
In a peg, the real appreciation would take place through a period of inflation, 
with the increase in government expenditure accommodated by the central bank. 
The increase in aggregate demand and real appreciation would again increase net 
import demand, leading the central bank to sell foreign exchange in defence of 
the peg.  
(ii)   Aid neither absorbed nor spent is the opposite extreme case. Increased aid 
inflows are used to build international reserves, and the government neither 
increases its expenditures nor lowers taxes. In this case there is no expansionary 
impact on aggregate demand, and no pressure on the exchange rate or prices. 
However, not spending the aid may be infeasible over a longer time period, as 
donors need to account for how their assistance has been used. Of course, money 
is fungible, so that in principle not spending aid dollars is compatible with 
undertaking the projects favoured by donors, while cutting back on other 
budgetary expenditures. In practice, the extent to which this is possible would 
depend on the room available—both fiscally and politically—to cut expenditures 
in other areas. 
  Constraints on sectoral and administrative capacity are also likely to affect 
spending and absorption decisions—particularly in the short run and at the 
subnational level. With the scaling up of aid, the share of priority public 
expenditure assigned to subnational governments is increasing. However, the 
capacity of these governments to design and implement priority programmes and 
to ensure that scaled-up funds reach the intended users is weak in many   
low-income countries. In these circumstances, some countries could decide to  
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save part of the aid flows to finance higher public expenditures in the future, 
when capacity constraints are less severe. 
(iii)   Aid absorbed but not spent. In this case, the government neither increases its 
expenditures nor lowers taxes after an aid surge, but the central bank sells aid 
dollars to finance an increase in net imports. Such a policy response could be 
appropriate for achieving stabilization or retiring large domestic public debt. Aid 
surge can be used to reduce inflation in countries that have not yet achieved 
stabilization. In such a case, the authorities can sell the foreign exchange 
associated with increased aid inflows to sterilize the monetary impact of 
domestically-financed fiscal deficits. The result would typically be slower 
monetary growth, a more appreciated real exchange rate, and lower inflation. 
Aggregate demand may increase as the inflation tax declines, with a 
corresponding increase in private consumption and investment. The deterioration 
of the trade balance that often accompanies such a stabilization programme is 
financed by the aid inflow (Buffie et al. 2004). 
  Similarly, in countries with large domestic public debt, the government could 
use the proceeds from aid to reduce the stock of domestic public debt. This 
would tend to result in increased private consumption and investment, which 
would raise net imports through the indirect effect of higher private after-tax 
income on import demand. The extra foreign exchange sold by the central bank 
would finance this increased demand for net imports. Whether the strategy of 
retiring public debt using aid is appropriate depends partly on whether lower 
interest rates would translate into higher domestic investment or consumption. If 
there are no good private investment opportunities, for example, an increase in 
credit to the private sector could result in private capital outflows or a buildup of 
excess commercial bank reserves at the central bank. In addition, as with the 
neither-absorb-nor-spend strategy, donors’ needs to account for the use of their 
assistance may make it difficult to sustain a no-spending approach.  
(iv)  Aid spent but not absorbed is a situation when the fiscal deficit, net of aid, 
increases with the aid surge, but the authorities do not sell the foreign exchange 
required to finance additional net imports. The macroeconomic effects of such a 
fiscal expansion are similar to increasing government expenditures in the 
absence of aid, except that international reserves are higher. The increased 
deficits inject money into the economy.  
In this case, the aid does not serve to support the fiscal expansion. A transfer of 
real resources to the recipient country occurs only if aid finances additional net 
imports. Aid also serves as a way for the government to finance its domestic 
expenditures, as an alternative to domestic tax revenue or borrowing, either from 
the public or from the central bank. It may seem, therefore, that the financing of 
domestic expenditures, such as the hiring of nurses, is an alternative use for aid, 
in addition to imports. But this approach to the function of aid is misleading; 
after all, the government could always simply borrow from the central bank (i.e., 
print money) to finance increased domestic expenditures. Rather, the purpose of 
the aid is to provide the foreign exchange required to satisfy the increased 
demand for foreign currency resulting from higher import demand.  
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  In this case, absent foreign exchange sales to mop up the additional liquidity, the 
monetary policy options are the same as in the case of any domestically-financed 
fiscal expansion. One option is to allow the money supply to increase. This is 
essentially monetizing the fiscal expansion and would tend to be inflationary. 
Without foreign exchange sales, the nominal exchange rate will tend to 
depreciate as well, with a larger supply of domestic currency pushing up the 
price of foreign exchange. The resulting inflation tax helps contain absorption by 
transferring resources from the private sector. If, alternatively, the authorities 
resist nominal exchange rate depreciations, then the resulting inflation would 
generate a real appreciation, the demand for imports would eventually increase, 
and the supply of exports would decrease. Provided that foreign exchange was 
eventually sold to satisfy this demand for net imports, the foreign exchange sales 
would have a sterilizing impact and dampen inflation. With some delay, then, 
the aid would be used and absorbed. Although this strategy has the advantage 
that aid is eventually absorbed, the period of inflation may carry costs of its own, 
especially in countries with a history of high inflation.  
  Another response is to sterilize the fiscally-driven monetary expansion through 
the issuance of domestic securities. This strategy would tend to raise interest 
rates and crowd out private investment. In effect, there is a switch from private 
investment to government consumption or investment. This strategy is likely to 
be particularly difficult and costly in countries with thin financial markets. 
Moreover, depending on how open capital account is, such a strategy can also be 
self-defeating because higher domestic interest rate may attract international 
capital flows and appreciate the currency. 
  In this spent-but-not-absorbed case, the net effect on the real exchange rate will 
depend on a variety of factors. The fiscal expansion tends to raise demand for 
nontraded goods, causing an appreciation; on the other hand, it increases import 
demand and lowers export supply, pushing the exchange rate towards 
depreciation. The net effect depends, inter alia, on the price and income 
elasticity of the country’s export supply and import demand. In addition, the 
central bank’s resistance to absorption creates pressures for real depreciation. In 
a float, aid-related liquidity injections will tend to depreciate the nominal and, in 
the short run, the real exchange rate. Over time, higher inflation and the 
associated inflation tax will reduce private demand and lower the real exchange 
rate and absorption. Alternatively, sterilization through the sale of securities will 
also depress private demand and hence the real exchange rate and absorption. In 
a peg, only the sterilization channel operates.  
Which of these four policy responses is best in the face of a surge in aid depends on 
many factors, including the level of official reserves, the existing debt burden, the 
current level of inflation, and the degree of aid volatility. For specific situations, some 
responses are more promising than others. For example, to neither spend nor absorb 
may be an appropriate short-run strategy where aid inflows are very volatile or 
international reserves are very low.5 Similarly, to absorb but not spend the aid might be 
                                                 
5   Bulíř and Hamann (2003, 2006) find that aid continues to be volatile, that aid commitments 
consistently exceed disbursements, and that aid disbursements are generally procyclical. Arellano et al 
(2005) indicates that aid volatility can be very costly in welfare terms. Prati and Tressel (2006) 
construct a theoretical model to examine the optimal pattern of absorption.  
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an appropriate response if inflation is too high or domestic debt is too large. However, 
the most appropriate response under ‘normal’ circumstances would be to spend and 
absorb the additional aid. This is the only case where there is a real resource transfer 
through an aid-financed increase in net imports, and a corresponding increase in public 
expenditures.  
3  Findings from country studies 
The headline measure of aid is ‘net aid inflows’ because it best captures the actual 
inflows of foreign exchange and hence the scale of the macroeconomic challenge.6 All 
the countries in the sample experienced a surge in net aid in recent years. The surge in 
net aid ranged from an average of 2 per cent of GDP in Tanzania to an average of 8 per 
cent of GDP in Ethiopia. Except in Ghana, the surge in aid was persistent, as aid inflows 
remained substantially higher than in the pre-surge period. Net budgetary aid usually 
differs from net aid to the economy, for example, because some aid is channelled 
directly to the private sector and spent on projects outside the government budget. In 
this sample, however, the two aid measures behave similarly; the surge in net budgetary 
aid ranged from an average of 3 per cent of GDP (Uganda) to 6 per cent of GDP 
(Ethiopia). When reviewed yearly to date, the aid surge was gradual and steady in 
Tanzania and Uganda, but was more volatile in the other three cases. 
Recently, there is a clear shift from project aid to direct budget support. Since the 
inception of the country-owned poverty reduction strategy approach in 1999, donors 
have been increasingly willing to channel their assistance to the recipient country’s 
general budget. This eases administrative and institutional constraints in recipient 
economies, and gives recipient countries more flexibility in spending the aid.  
3.1  Real exchange rate and Dutch disease 
There was no sign of Dutch disease in the sense that real exchange rates in the sample 
did not appreciate during the aid surges (Table 1). Except for Ghana, there is typically a 
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate during the years in which aid inflows 
surged.7 A real depreciation in the face of surging aid inflows may indicate (i) structural 
features of the economy such as a rapid supply response to aid expenditures or high 
import propensities, though this would tend to mitigate the appreciation rather than 
cause a depreciation; (ii) a fiscal and monetary policy stance that leans against real 
appreciation; or (iii) other exogenous events, notably a negative terms-of-trade shock. 
Subsequent sections consider the first two explanations. With respect to the latter, two 
countries in the sample, Ethiopia and Uganda, were hit by significant negative terms-of-
trade shocks during the aid-surge period. However, even in these cases the incremental 
                                                 
6   Net aid is gross aid plus debt relief, net of amortization, interest payments on public debt and arrears 
clearance; gross aid is the sum of grants and loans, including both programme and project financing. 
7  The reported real effective exchange rate (REER) is based on nominal exchange rates and consumer 
prices (CPI) in the target country and its trade partners. Lack of data prevents supplementing these 
indices with the REER measured by unit labour costs, or as the ratio between nontradables and 
tradables prices.   
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aid flows were much larger than the scale of the terms-of-trade shocks. There is also no 
case where a significant change in private inflows counteracts the pattern of aid inflows. 
Consistent with real depreciation, export performance was strong in most of the sample, 
especially in Mozambique and Tanzania. In Ghana too, export performance was strong 
despite a stable real exchange rate. In both countries that were affected by the decline in 
coffee prices, real depreciation helped export performance. In particular, nontraditional 
exports grew strongly, and increased as a proportion of total exports, enabling robust 
export growth in Ethiopia and moderating the decline in exports in Uganda. 
Table 1 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) 
(Per cent change over previous year, unless otherwise specified) 
  Pre-aid surge average  Average for aid-surge period 
Ethiopia 1999-2000  2001-03 
REER (depreciation - )  -2.0  -2.1 
NEER (depreciation - )  -5.0  -1.5 
RER (bilateral with dollar)  -5.7  -1.9 
Terms of trade  -18.3  -4.1 
Exports -9.6  -0.1 
Nontraditional exports/exports (% ratio)  44.0  63.5 
Ghana 1999-2000  2001-03 
REER (depreciation - )  -17.5  0.5 
NEER (depreciation - )  -27.8  -17.8 
RER (bilateral with dollar)  -12.0  -6.6 
Terms of trade  -12.7  9.7 
Exports -3.8  8.9 
Nontraditional exports/exports (%)  30.2  33.0 
Mozambique 1998-99  2000-02 
REER (depreciation - )  0.0  -6.4 
NEER (depreciation - )  1.6  -14.1 
RER (bilateral with dollar)  -5.0  -11.1 
Terms of trade  -8.8  1.2 
Exports 11.2  39.5 
Nontraditional exports/exports (%)  NA  NA 
Tanzania 1998-99  2000-04 
REER (depreciation - )  -2.3  -9.8 
NEER (depreciation - )  6.3  -8.7 
RER (bilateral with dollar)  3.5  -6.1 
Terms of trade  3.3  -4.1 
Exports -17.3  16.1 
Nontraditional exports/exports (%)  41.3  74.7 
Uganda 1999-2000  2001-03 
REER (depreciation - )  -6.6  -6.3 
NEER (depreciation - )  -8.6  -5.8 
RER (bilateral with dollar)  -12.0  -6.6 
Terms of trade  -14.0  -3.6 
Exports 1.1  4.0 
Nontraditional exports/exports (%)  51.4  78.9 
Note:  REER = real effective exchange rate; 
  NEER = nominal effective exchange rate; 
  RER = real exchange rate. 
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3.2  Was incremental aid absorbed? 
In general, country authorities were reluctant to fully absorb the incremental aid, as 
evident from small change in the non-aid current account deficit compared to the size of 
aid surge in the same period (Table 2). Only in Mozambique, absorption was over half 
the incremental aid inflow. On the other hand, in Tanzania and Ghana, the non-aid 
current account actually improved by 2 and 10 percentage points of GDP, respectively, 
implying that the incremental aid was not absorbed. In all countries, the aid surge 
increased the rate of reserve accumulation, which is consistent with the lack of the real 
exchange rate appreciation following the surge in aid inflows. 
In all countries, part of the aid increment was lost through reductions in the rate of 
capital inflow. In Ghana and Tanzania, the deterioration in the capital account excluding 
aid was either comparable to or exceeded the entire increment in the aid inflow.8 It 
 
Table 2 
Allocation of incremental net aid: absorbed or accumulation as reserves 
(annual averages in % of GDP) 






Ethiopia 1999-2000  2001-03   
Net aid inflows  5.3  13.3  8.0   
Non-aid current account balance  -9.2  -10.8  -1.6  Partly absorbed
Non-aid capital account balance  2.0  1.3  -0.7  20% 
Change in reserves (increase - )  1.9  -3.8  -5.7   
Ghana 1999-2000  2001-03   
Net aid inflows  1.3  6.8  5.5   
Non-aid current account balance  -13.4  -3.4  10.0  Not absorbed 
Non-aid capital account balance  9.9  2.1  -7.8  0% 
Change in reserves (increase - )  2.2  -5.4  -7.6   
Mozambique 1998-99  2000-02   
Net aid inflows  11.5  17.4  5.9   
Non-aid current account balance  -19.7  -23.6  -3.9  Mostly absorbed
Non-aid capital account balance  8.7  8.3  -0.4  66% 
Change in reserves (increase - )  -0.5  -2.1  -1.7   
Tanzania 1998-99  2000-04     
Net aid inflows  5.6  7.8  2.2   
Non-aid current account balance  -9.2  -6.8  2.3  Not absorbed 
Non-aid capital account balance  4.1  1.7  -2.4  0% 
Change in reserves (increase - )  -0.6  -2.7  -2.2   
Uganda 1999-2000  2001-03   
Net aid inflows  8.9  13.6  4.7   
Non-aid current account balance  -10.1 -11.4 -1.3  Partly  absorbed
Non-aid capital account balance  1.6  -1.1  -2.8  27% 
Change in reserves (increase - )  -0.4  -1.1  -0.7   
Note:  Errors and omissions are included in the capital account; 
  1  Non-aid current account deterioration as a per cent of incremental aid inflow is truncated at 
0 and 100. 
Source:  IMF staff reports. 
                                                 
8  In some countries, large errors and omissions in the balance of payments accounts could be partly 
responsible for measured fluctuations in the capital account.  
10 
contradicts some recent studies (e.g., Buffie et al. 2004) that argue additional aid helps  
reduce seigniorage and hence expected inflation, and, thereby, may lead to domestic 
agents substituting foreign assets with domestic assets, which would appear in the 
balance of payments as a capital inflow. Were the reductions in capital inflows in 
Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda a result of the aid surge itself? If so, the aid surges did 
not serve their intended purpose of promoting absorption. Aid inflows that trigger 
capital outflows weaken the link between central bank sales of foreign exchange and 
absorption, because a (possibly volatile and unpredictable) part of the foreign exchange 
may leave the country through private capital account transactions.  
Some short-run movements in the non-aid capital account could reflect lags between 
foreign exchange being made available for absorption and the actual increase in imports 
that comprises absorption. For example, consider a case in which government 
expenditures raise wages, which then increase the workers’ demand for imports. 
However, when workers purchase dollars from the central bank, they do not 
immediately spend them on imports, but in the first instance, deposit them in dollar 
accounts held with domestic commercial banks. This would count as a deterioration in 
the non-aid capital account due to an increase in commercial banks’ net foreign assets. 
Subsequently, when they spend the dollars on imports, there would be a corresponding 
improvement in the non-aid capital account. However, this would not seem to be an 
adequate explanation for the more sustained changes observed in the sample. Further 
research is needed to identify the direction of causation between the changes in aid and 
the changes in capital flows, and also to identify the appropriate counterfactual, which is 
what would have happened in the absence of aid. 
3.3  Was incremental aid spent? 
The governments in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda spent most of the additional 
foreign assistance (Table 3). A variety of factors encouraged these countries to spend 
the incremental budgetary aid. Because these countries had attained macroeconomic 
stability in the mid-to-late 1990s before the aid surge, reducing domestic financing of 
the budget deficit was not a major goal. Neither was retiring domestic public debt a key 
objective, as these countries had rather low domestic financing of the deficit as well as 
domestic debt and debt service prior to the aid surge. Furthermore, they had 
strengthened their expenditure management systems, partly because of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which helped them spend most of the 
incremental aid that they received as programme assistance. To the extent that these 
countries spent the aid increments, the additional spending was concentrated on capital 
and poverty-reducing expenditures. 
The governments in Ghana and Ethiopia, however, spent very little of the incremental 
aid. These countries had a relatively weak record of macroeconomic stability, and a low 
level of international reserves before the aid surge, which limited their ability to spend 
additional aid. As these countries also had relatively high domestic debt and domestic 
financing of the budget prior to the aid surge, reducing domestic public debt and hence 
debt service was also a consideration for not spending the additional aid. In Ghana, 
which experienced highly volatile aid inflows, aid volatility appears to have been a 
major factor in saving incremental aid in 2003. In Ethiopia, limited administrative 
capacity and weak institutions following the conflict with Eritrea may have been 
additional factors.   
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Table 3 
Allocation of incremental net aid: absorbed or accumulation as reserves 
(annual averages in % of GDP) 





spent or not2 
Ethiopia        
Net fiscal aid inflows  5.3  11.2  5.9   
Revenue (excl. grants)  18.0 19.4 1.5  Not  spent 
Expenditure (excl. external interest) 31.8  32.5  0.7  0% 
Overall fiscal balance before aid  -13.8  -13.0  0.8   
Ghana        
Net fiscal aid inflows  1.3  7.3  6.0   
Revenue (excl. grants)  17.1 19.0 1.9  Not  spent 
Expenditure (excl. external interest) 27.0  29.3  2.3  7% 
Overall fiscal balance before aid  -9.9  -10.3  -0.4   
Mozambique        
Net fiscal aid inflows  12.9  17.9  5.0   
Revenue (excl. grants) 12.6  13.9  1.3  Spent 
Expenditure (excl. external interest) 26.0  32.7  6.7  100% 
Overall fiscal balance before aid  -13.0  -18.5  -5.5   
Tanzania        
Net fiscal aid inflows  4.7  8.6  3.9   
Revenue (excl. grants) 12.1  12.5  0.4  Spent 
Expenditure (excl. external interest) 16.7  20.7  4.0  91% 
Overall fiscal balance before aid  -4.8  -8.3  -3.5   
Uganda        
Net fiscal aid inflows  9.3  12.5  3.2   
Revenue (excl. grants)  12.6 12.8 0.1  Mostly  spent 
Expenditure (excl. external interest) 22.2  24.7  2.5  74% 
Overall fiscal balance before aid  -9.6  -12.0  -2.4   
Note:  1  For all countries except Tanzania, 1999-2000 constitute the pre-aid surge period, and   
2001-03 the aid-surge period. For Tanzania, 1998-99 is the pre-aid surge period and 2000-
04 is the aid-surge period. 
  2  Non-aid current account deterioration as a per cent of incremental aid inflow is truncated at 
0 and 100. 
Source:  IMF staff reports.   
Aid volatility also contributed to some governments’ choice of not spending the aid 
increments. There are two broad fiscal responses to aid volatility: adjust expenditures in 
line with the aid fluctuations, or smooth spending by building up reserves (and 
government deposits) when aid is up and drawing down these savings when aid 
shortfalls occur. For example, in Ghana, overall expenditures were relatively 
unresponsive to aid volatility, and past aid savings as well as additional domestic 
financing were used to offset shortfalls in budgetary aid. To some extent, the preference 
to build up official reserves in Ethiopia and Ghana appears to have contributed to saving 
the incremental aid, particularly in the second aid surge in Ghana in 2003. 
Because a government can also spend budget aid indirectly by lowering taxes and 
transferring aid to the private sector, additional aid could lower revenue collection 
efforts in recipient countries. Some evidence exists to support this view, though the 
effect is modest except in countries with relatively high levels of corruption 




Policy response to aid surge (in per cent) 
 Not  spent1  Partly spent  Mostly spent  Fully spent 
Not absorbed2 Ghana 
(0,  7) 
   Tanzania 
(0, 91) 
Partly absorbed  Ethiopia 
(20,  0) 
 Uganda 
(27,  24) 
 
Mostly absorbed      Mozambique 
(66,  100) 
Fully absorbed 
 
    
Notes:  1  ‘Spent’ variable = non-aid fiscal balance deterioration as per cent of incremental aid inflow. 
Truncated at 0 and 100. This variable is the second entry within brackets for each country.  
  2  ‘Absorb’  variable = non-aid current account deterioration as per cent of incremental aid 
inflow. Truncated at 0 and 100. This variable is the first entry within brackets for each 
country. 
considerations and evidence from other countries, the revenue-to-GDP ratio either 
improved (in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique) or remained largely unchanged (in 
Tanzania and Uganda). For the latter cases, one can argue that additional fiscal aid 
might have reduced the incentives for aid recipients to strengthen revenue efforts, as 
total revenues stagnated below 15 per cent of GDP.9 
Surprisingly, a full absorb-and-spend response is not observed in any of the sample 
countries (Table 4). Two cases (Ethiopia and Ghana) adopted a ‘neither absorb nor 
spend’ response to the aid surge. A number of related but distinct factors seemed to 
underlie this response. First, both countries went into the aid-surge period with a 
precariously low level of international reserves and a need to establish macroeconomic 
stability. Hence, building sufficient import coverage was one motive for accumulating 
the aid. Second, aid volatility probably played a role in determining absorption 
behaviour in some years. For example, in 2003, when aid surged again in Ghana after 
collapsing the previous year, part of the motivation for the don’t-absorb-don’t-spend 
strategy was to protect against excessive fiscal tightening in the event of a future 
reduction in aid inflows. Third, nonabsorption may have been governed by a desire to 
avoid appreciation and preserve international competitiveness and, when coupled with a 
policy of not increasing government expenditures, to curb inflation (in Ghana’s case) or 
to keep inflation in check (in Ethiopia’s case).  
The remaining three countries (Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda) spent the 
incremental aid without fully absorbing it. The dominant factor behind this response 
appears to have been a desire to preserve international competitiveness, manifested in 
an unwillingness to see the nominal or real exchange rate appreciate. Thus, the central 
                                                 
9  Of course, in the absence of a counterfactual, it is difficult to gauge whether revenue effort was 
harmed by aid. One indicator, however, is provided by revenue targets under the IMF programmes. In 
general these targets were met by most countries in the sample for most periods. The exceptions were 
Ethiopia and Mozambique, which missed several quarterly targets on government revenue. However, 
these episodes did not appear to be the result of moral hazard arising from increased aid inflows. In 
Ethiopia, the 2004 ex-post assessment argues that the revenue targets were overly ambitious given the 
pace of structural adjustment in the country. In Mozambique, these episodes were more attributable to 
a drop in excise and import taxes to offset an increase in world oil prices.  
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banks of each country accumulated international reserves throughout the aid-surge 
period, despite a relatively comfortable level of import coverage. This still begs the 
question of why, in the face of the desire to avoid appreciation, the aid was spent at all? 
One explanation may be that political pressures make it difficult to resist spending aid 
money. For example, donors may object to having the aid they provide simply 
accumulated in government deposits at the central bank. Indeed, loans for projects could 
require a certain amount of domestic expenditures every year, at the risk of being 
stopped altogether. 
These cases illustrate the risk that policies on spending aid inflows may be inconsistent 
with policies on exchange rate and monetary management of these same inflows. This 
may be partly because the link between these two sets of issues may not be fully 
understood by all the relevant policymakers. It may also be because institutional 
responsibilities for these two sets of issues are separated. Fiscal authorities and donors 
will find it entirely appropriate that aid inflows to the budget be spent. Central bank 
officials, on the other hand, may be more concerned about implications for the real 
exchange rate and the export sector. A spend-but-don’t-absorb response may be an 
unfortunate outcome that neither party fully desires.  
3.4  Monetary impact of aid and policy response 
On the basis of spending and absorption of aid, two main groups of countries can be 
discerned: (i) countries where the aid impact was limited because only a small part of it 
(if any) was either absorbed or spent (Ethiopia, Ghana); and (ii) countries where 
spending of aid exceeded absorption, resulting in an injection of domestic liquidity and 
creating upward pressure on prices (Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda). These 
patterns of absorption and spending defined the challenge for monetary policy in 
response to the aid surges. 
In neither Ethiopia nor Ghana was the aid surge accompanied by an increase in 
domestic spending in excess of revenue generation. Therefore, over the period as a 
whole, the aid did not lead to a substantial injection of domestic liquidity. Effectively, 
where there was a rise in the central bank’s net foreign assets, it was sterilized through 
an accumulation of government deposits at the central bank, by increasing reserve 
requirements for domestic banks, or by reducing the stock of domestic debt (in Ghana’s 
case). In Ethiopia, the growth rate of reserve money fell substantially during the 
beginning of the surge period. Inflation was very low when the aid surge commenced, 
and remained within a 2 to 5 per cent range throughout the aid-surge period. In Ghana, 
the rate of growth of reserve money declined significantly over its two distinct aid-surge 
periods. Although this was achieved partly by selling reserves in the 2001 surge, once 
the currency stabilized further aid inflows were accumulated as reserves. Inflation stood 
at over 40 per cent per annum when the aid surge began, but had fallen to about 15 per 
cent by end-2003. A policy geared towards using aid for reserve accumulation largely 
explains the lack of real appreciation of exchange rate for both countries. 
In three countries where fiscal authorities spent the aid but central banks were unwilling 
to allow full absorption of aid, the question arises as to how they handled the increase in 
money supply associated with this ‘spend-but-do-not-absorb’ response. Each of the 
three countries followed a combination of options: either allowing the money supply to 
increase or sterilizing monetary expansion through treasury bills. In all three countries,  
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concerns about the negative impact of a real exchange rate appreciation on 
competitiveness and negative terms-of-trade shocks led the central banks to contain net 
foreign exchange sales to a level consistent with a depreciating nominal exchange rate. 
Because the governments in these countries simultaneously increased domestic 
expenditures, this injection of liquidity led to inflationary pressures and various 
episodes of attempted sterilization through treasury bill sales.  
In Tanzania and Uganda, the authorities were largely successful in keeping inflation in 
check, with underlying inflation never exceeding 10 per cent during the aid-surge 
period. However, in both cases this was achieved at the expense of squeezing private 
sector investment through the sale of government paper during some periods. In 
Tanzania, the treasury bill rate rose from 2.6 per cent in September 2002 to 7.6 per cent 
by end-2003, while in Uganda two episodes of treasury bill sterilization pushed rates to 
over 20 per cent in early 2001 and end-2003.10 However, there were considerable year-
to-year policy variations in these countries. For example, in Tanzania, an early response 
focused on sterilizing aid-related liquidity through treasury bill sales was largely 
abandoned subsequently in favour of allowing the money supply to increase. This latter 
policy created excess liquidity in the banking system and eventually led to an increase 
in inflation. Thereafter, the authorities turned towards selling foreign exchange to 
sterilize the monetary injection associated with aid-related spending, resulting in a sharp 
rise in aid absorption and some real exchange rate appreciation. In effect, the authorities 
moved towards a delayed spend-and-absorb strategy. 
In Mozambique, despite more aid absorption than the other countries, the large fiscal 
expansion was also accompanied by more monetary loosening than in the other 
countries. Reserve money growth shot up from about 7 per cent per annum before the 
aid surge to 53 per cent in 2001. Inflation followed suit, peaking at well over 20 per cent 
in early 2002. From 2002 onward, however, the authorities undertook more sterilization 
through foreign exchange and treasury bill sales, bringing down reserve money growth. 
In addition, rapid GDP growth led to an increase in the demand for money. 
Consequently, inflation was brought under 10 per cent by 2003. 
Better adherence to absorb-and-spend response to aid surge would have reduced the 
need for sterilization through treasury bills, helping to avoid crowding out private sector 
investment in Tanzania and Uganda, and reducing inflation in Mozambique. This would 
have been a more suitable response to the surge in aid inflows because, unlike Ethiopia 
and Ghana, the level of import coverage afforded by gross reserves was quite high in all 
three countries.  
4  Conclusions and policy implications 
Some countries experienced significant macroeconomic constraints in fully absorbing 
aid. Although there is considerable variation from year to year, on a cumulative basis no 
country in the sample entirely absorbed the increased level of aid. Absorption ranged 
                                                 
10 Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile (2007) document how the sterilization strategy led to a sixfold 
increase in net sales of government securities. The bulk of the purchases were made by commercial 
banks, which doubled their ratios of government security holdings to deposits, while their loans to the 
private sector fell by an almost equivalent amount.  
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from two-thirds for Mozambique to zero for Ghana and Tanzania. Despite the 
conjecture that to absorb and spend is generally the best use of aid, no country in the 
sample systematically pursued this strategy. 
There is no evidence in the sample of significant real exchange rate appreciation and 
hence the problem of Dutch disease as a result of a surge in aid, which is consistent 
with the pattern of aid absorption noted above. If aid is accumulated in reserves, then 
there is no need for a real exchange rate appreciation to induce an increase in net 
imports and thereby absorb the aid. Of course, part of the reason that real appreciation 
(and consequently, Dutch disease) was not observed is precisely because authorities 
were concerned with competitiveness and restricted absorption accordingly. 
Some countries—Ethiopia and Ghana—saved the increase in aid, neither spending nor 
absorbing.  Both entered the aid-surge period with a precariously low level of reserves 
and used the additional aid to build those reserves. In Ethiopia, reserves were 
accumulated to bolster the de facto exchange rate peg against the dollar. In Ghana, a 
buffer against extremely volatile aid inflows was built.  
Other countries—Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda—failed to use aid to increase net 
imports at the same time as they increased fiscal spending; they did spend but not 
absorb.  This is potentially the most problematic response to aid surges. It can create 
high inflation, as it did in Mozambique, or require substantial treasury bill sterilization, 
and hence high interest rates and increases in domestic debt, to keep inflation in check. 
However, concerns about the negative impact of a real appreciation on competitiveness 
dictated this policy response. Thus, the central banks of each country accumulated large 
international reserves throughout the aid-surge period, despite a relatively comfortable 
level of import coverage. The fiscal authorities on the other hand spent aid money, 
possibly because of political pressures. For example, donors may object to having their 
aid simply saved in government deposits at the central bank. These cases illustrate the 
risk that policies on spending aid inflows may be inconsistent with policies on exchange 
rate and monetary management of these same inflows. 
Whether the aid surges were inflationary or stabilizing depended on the macroeconomic 
policy reaction. In Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, aid inflows did create 
inflationary pressures, because the excess of spending over absorption injected domestic 
liquidity. In Mozambique, the gap was particularly large, and hence the country 
experienced high inflation. In Tanzania and Uganda, the inflationary pressures led to 
various episodes of sterilization through treasury bill sales. Although inflation in these 
countries was consequently contained below 10 per cent, this came at the cost of rising 
interest rates, and in Uganda’s case, a rapidly rising level of domestic debt. With an 
absorbed-but-not-spent policy response, aid can help reduce inflation, as was the case in 
Ethiopia and Ghana in 2001.  
The consistency of monetary and exchange rate policy with fiscal policy needs greater 
attention in cases where the authorities spend but do not absorb the aid. One option 
would be to limit spending as well, following the pattern of Ghana. This would have the 
merit of avoiding macroeconomic difficulties while saving the aid for later and would 
make sense if Dutch disease concerns outweigh the benefits from the absorption of aid 
inflows. Where aid inflows are volatile, international reserves are too low, or good 
projects cannot be implemented, reserve accumulation may be the most reasonable 
short-run response.  
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Another option is to allow the monetary expansion necessary to accommodate increased 
expenditures, and accept inflation as the mechanism through which real appreciation 
occurs. This policy may work well in the short run, especially if a rapid supply response 
tempers inflation. In the medium term, the incremental domestic expenditures should 
increase the demand for imports, and the saved foreign exchange then allows the 
authorities to accommodate this increased import demand without running low on 
international reserves. This requires some tolerance for a period of higher inflation to 
achieve the required real appreciation and, critically, a willingness on the part of the 
central bank to eventually sell foreign exchange as the current account deficit increases. 
If the central bank fails to defend the nominal exchange rate, inflation will increase 
without causing real appreciation, which is an inferior response. 
Yet another option is to combat inflationary pressures through treasury bill 
sterilization—an option attempted by most of the countries in the sample (Mozambique, 
Uganda, and initially, Tanzania). This option is, however, likely to be suboptimal under 
many circumstances. Again, aid is not absorbed, while domestic public expenditures in 
conjunction with higher interest rates potentially crowd out private investment. In 
addition, where monetary expansion has not yet led to higher inflation and the nominal 
exchange rate remains stable, excessive treasury bill sterilization could prevent delayed 
absorption. However, sterilization would generally be preferable to inflation as a source 
of domestic financing (IMF 2005b). Thus, in a country with a given spend-and-not-
absorb policy, perhaps politically dictated, where inflation is high or rising, there would 
be a case for sterilization through treasury bills.  
The key long-run strategic choice is whether to use the aid—by absorbing and 
spending—or not, in which case the aid should be neither absorbed nor spent. The latter 
choice is equivalent to refusing aid altogether.  Other responses should, at most, 
short run. To spend and not absorb is not a desirable long-run strategy because it implies 
that aid is serving not to finance additional net imports but to trigger additional 
domestically-financed spending. 
The typical discussion of the monetary management of aid inflows focuses on the 
question of how to manage the consequences of aid-related spending. Presuming the 
government necessarily spends the aid receipts, the central bank chooses the appropriate 
instrument for sterilization—that is, whether to sell foreign exchange causing some real 
appreciation, or to sell government bonds inducing an interest rate hike. This line of 
thought leads to the view that central banks need to balance the risks of excessive 
exchange rate appreciation against excessive interest rate increases and choose some 
reasonable middle ground. This perspective fails to treat the analysis of monetary and 
fiscal policy jointly.  
When lack of aid spending is an outcome of sectoral and administrative constraints, 
recipient governments and their development partners should focus on building 
capacity, particularly at the local government levels. As delivery of services such as 
education and health is increasingly being assigned to local governments, strengthening 
of public administration at local level would be important for full and effective spending 
of aid. In this regard, countries will need to adopt innovative approaches to address 
human capital constraints (e.g., number of teachers or health workers) in order to 
expand service provision. Until capacity constraints are properly addressed, some aid 
could be saved in the short term.  
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The critical question for aid recipients is how to balance the costs and benefits of 
absorbing and spending aid. The rate of return to aid-financed investments will likely 
decline as the rate of investment rises—the best projects should be the first undertaken. 
Moreover, resources will be drawn out of other uses to implement aid projects, and this 
will likely become progressively costlier. The implication is that there may be a level of 
investments beyond which the rate of return will be lower than that achieved in 
alternative uses. Absorptive capacity has been reached when aid-financed investments 
do not yield enough to justify the resources used to produce them. 
If the judgment is made in a particular situation that the costs of absorbing and spending 
outweigh the benefits, what is to be done? One possible solution is raise absorptive 
capacity. It is critical to make expenditures more effective, including by improving 
project choice and expenditure management, and more broadly the overall policy 
environment (Bevan 2005). For example, a carefully designed and scaled-up investment 
programme may raise the rate of return while minimizing the cost for the traded-goods 
sector. An aid-financed investment programme aimed at improving productivity—via 
better roads, education, and health—may outweigh the effects of the real exchange rate 
appreciation (Bourguignon et al. 2005). However, raising absorptive capacity is easier 
said than done, and the stakes are high: if the aid-related spending turns out not to be 
effective, not only is the aid wasted, but scarce domestic resources were misallocated 
and the traded-goods sector shrunk. 
Another option is spending aid directly on noncompetitive imports, and thereby creating 
fewer tensions with an export-led growth strategy. For example, using aid to import 
factors of production used in the export sector (e.g., chemical fertilizer) would not tend 
to create pressure on the real exchange rate.  
Yet another possibility is to save the aid until it can be effectively used. This would 
imply accumulating reserves and not increasing the budget deficit. However, this 
solution has two major problems. First, it is politically hard to limit government 
spending of the local currency counterpart to the aid inflows—after all, the aid has been 
given and the needs are great. This would lead to the spend-and-not-absorb policy 
denigrated previously. Second, a country that saves aid inflows in this fashion would 
alienate donors, who might decide to reallocate the aid to a more eager recipient.  
The countries covered in this study had by the end of the period under review built 
reserves to levels adequate to meet their needs for shocks, such as to the terms-of-trade 
and aid. In this context, further reserve accumulation becomes more unattractive and the 
risk increases that what had been a latent Dutch disease problem becomes real. The role 
of an investment programme aimed at improving productivity becomes even more 
critical in this situation. 
Donors can help resolve some of these tensions by improving the quality of aid. Aid that 
is less tied and creates less burden on limited administrative capacity in the recipient 
country would be more useful. Similarly, aid that is more predictable, and in particular 
that can be relied on over the medium term, can be spent and absorbed more effectively. 
Also, aid that buffers temporary negative shocks may be more readily used, insofar as 
stabilization of the exchange rate and aggregate demand in the face of a temporary 
contraction would not tend to raise competitiveness concerns. At the same time, the 
authorities in aid-recipient countries must balance a complex set of objectives involving 
fiscal policy and exchange rate and reserve management. But one message is simple: a  
18 
given aid dollar can be used to build reserves or to finance the fiscal deficit, but not 
both. The cases reviewed in this paper suggest that trying to do so may make aid less 
effective. 
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